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## Why Private IP destinations always bypassed inherited upstream proxies, preventing their use for private networks reachable through an upstream VPN proxy. ## What changed - Add `codex exec-server --proxy-private-ips-via-upstream`, also configurable with `CODEX_EXEC_SERVER_PROXY_PRIVATE_IPS_VIA_UPSTREAM=true`. The setting defaults to disabled. - Allow permitted RFC 1918, carrier-grade NAT, and IPv6 unique-local destinations to use an applicable upstream proxy. Loopback and link-local destinations retain direct routing, and destination access policy still applies. - Keep connections direct when no valid upstream proxy applies or `allow_upstream_proxy=false`. Errors after selecting an upstream proxy do not trigger a direct retry. - Rename `ExecServerRuntimePaths` to `ExecServerRuntimeOptions` and carry the routing setting from executor startup into the managed network proxy. ## Testing Add routing coverage for private address ranges, special-use addresses, and public targets with the option enabled and disabled. Verify that HTTP and CONNECT requests still enforce destination allowlists and denylists, and update the CLI help snapshot. GitOrigin-RevId: b7c9cc7da0e0f545694a6521b74c9b36b7b92769
177 lines
6.0 KiB
Rust
177 lines
6.0 KiB
Rust
use std::fmt;
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use anyhow::Result;
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use codex_exec_server::Environment;
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use codex_exec_server::ExecServerRuntimeOptions;
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use codex_exec_server::ExecutorFileSystem;
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use codex_exec_server::FileSystemSandboxContext;
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use codex_exec_server::LocalFileSystem;
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use codex_exec_server::WindowsSandboxSelection;
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use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
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use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
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use codex_utils_path_uri::PathUri;
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use crate::common::exec_server::ExecServerHarness;
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use crate::common::exec_server::TestCodexHelperPaths;
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use crate::common::exec_server::exec_server;
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use crate::common::exec_server::test_codex_helper_paths;
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pub(crate) struct FileSystemContext {
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pub(crate) file_system: Arc<dyn ExecutorFileSystem>,
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_helper_paths: Option<TestCodexHelperPaths>,
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_server: Option<ExecServerHarness>,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
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pub(crate) enum FileSystemImplementation {
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Local,
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Remote,
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}
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impl fmt::Display for FileSystemImplementation {
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fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
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match self {
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Self::Local => formatter.write_str("local"),
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Self::Remote => formatter.write_str("remote"),
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}
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}
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}
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pub(crate) async fn create_file_system_context(
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implementation: FileSystemImplementation,
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) -> Result<FileSystemContext> {
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match implementation {
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FileSystemImplementation::Local => {
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let helper_paths = test_codex_helper_paths()?;
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let runtime_paths = ExecServerRuntimeOptions::new(
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helper_paths.codex_exe.clone(),
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helper_paths.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.clone(),
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)?;
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Ok(FileSystemContext {
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file_system: Arc::new(LocalFileSystem::with_runtime_paths(runtime_paths)),
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_helper_paths: Some(helper_paths),
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_server: None,
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})
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}
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FileSystemImplementation::Remote => {
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let server = exec_server().await?;
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let environment =
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Environment::create_for_tests(Some(server.websocket_url().to_string()))?;
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Ok(FileSystemContext {
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file_system: environment.get_filesystem(),
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_helper_paths: None,
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_server: Some(server),
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})
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}
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}
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}
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#[cfg(windows)]
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pub(crate) fn is_unsupported_restricted_token_host<T>(result: &std::io::Result<T>) -> bool {
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result
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.as_ref()
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.err()
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.is_some_and(|err| err.to_string().contains("CreateRestrictedToken failed: 87"))
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}
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pub(crate) fn absolute_path(path: std::path::PathBuf) -> AbsolutePathBuf {
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assert!(
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path.is_absolute(),
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"path must be absolute: {}",
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path.display()
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);
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AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(path).expect("path should be absolute")
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}
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pub(crate) fn read_only_sandbox(readable_root: std::path::PathBuf) -> FileSystemSandboxContext {
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let readable_root = absolute_path(readable_root);
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let cwd = PathUri::from_abs_path(&readable_root);
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let entries = vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
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path: FileSystemPath::Path {
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path: readable_root.into(),
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},
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access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
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missing_path_behavior: None,
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}];
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sandbox_context(entries, cwd)
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}
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#[cfg(not(windows))]
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pub(crate) fn workspace_write_sandbox(
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writable_root: std::path::PathBuf,
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) -> FileSystemSandboxContext {
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let writable_root = absolute_path(writable_root);
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let cwd = PathUri::from_abs_path(&writable_root);
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let entries = vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
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path: FileSystemPath::Path {
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path: writable_root.into(),
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},
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access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
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missing_path_behavior: None,
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}];
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sandbox_context(entries, cwd)
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}
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#[cfg(windows)]
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pub(crate) fn workspace_write_sandbox(
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writable_root: std::path::PathBuf,
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) -> FileSystemSandboxContext {
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let writable_root = absolute_path(writable_root);
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// Keep the runtime policy aligned with the legacy workspace-write projection used by the
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// unelevated restricted-token preflight.
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let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
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FileSystemSandboxEntry::new(
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FileSystemPath::Special {
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value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
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},
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FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
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),
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FileSystemSandboxEntry::new(
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FileSystemPath::Special {
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value: FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(/*subpath*/ None),
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},
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FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
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),
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]);
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let mut sandbox = FileSystemSandboxContext::from_permission_profile(
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PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(&policy, NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted),
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PathUri::from_abs_path(&writable_root),
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);
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sandbox.windows_sandbox_selection = WindowsSandboxSelection::RestrictedToken;
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sandbox
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}
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fn sandbox_context(
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mut entries: Vec<FileSystemSandboxEntry>,
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cwd: PathUri,
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) -> FileSystemSandboxContext {
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if cfg!(windows) {
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// Restricted-token sandboxing cannot enforce read restrictions, so leave the root
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// readable while exercising the requested write restrictions.
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entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry::new(
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FileSystemPath::Special {
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value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
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},
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FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
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));
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}
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let mut sandbox = FileSystemSandboxContext::from_permission_profile(
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PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
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&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(entries),
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NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
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),
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cwd,
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);
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if cfg!(windows) {
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sandbox.windows_sandbox_selection = WindowsSandboxSelection::RestrictedToken;
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}
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sandbox
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}
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