openclaw/docs/cli/security.md

summary, read_when, title

summary	read_when	title
CLI reference for `openclaw security` (audit and fix common security footguns)	You want to run a quick security audit on config/state You want to apply safe "fix" suggestions (permissions, tighten defaults)	Security CLI

openclaw security

Security tools: audit plus optional safe fixes. Related: Security.

openclaw security audit
openclaw security audit --deep
openclaw security audit --deep --password <password>
openclaw security audit --deep --token <token>
openclaw security audit --auth password --password <password>
openclaw security audit --fix
openclaw security audit --json

Audit modes

Plain security audit stays on the cold config/filesystem/read-only path: it does not discover plugin runtime security collectors, so routine audits do not load every installed plugin runtime. --deep adds best-effort live Gateway probes and plugin-owned security audit collectors (explicit internal callers may also opt into those collectors when they already have an appropriate runtime scope).

If Gateway password auth is supplied only at startup, pass the same value with --auth password --password <password> so the audit can check it against hooks.token.

What it checks

DM/trust model

• Warns when multiple DM senders share the main session and recommends secure DM mode: session.dmScope="per-channel-peer" (or per-account-channel-peer for multi-account channels) for shared inboxes. This is cooperative/shared-inbox hardening, not isolation for mutually untrusted operators; split trust boundaries with separate gateways (or separate OS users/hosts) for that.
• Emits security.trust_model.group_scope_main when global session.groupScope="main" or a binding override merges group/channel rooms into the main session. Every member of each matched room shares that context, so reserve this for trusted rooms (see Groups).
• Emits security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic when config suggests likely shared-user ingress (for example open DM/group policy, configured group targets, or wildcard sender rules) — OpenClaw's default trust model is personal-assistant (one operator), not hostile multi-tenant isolation. For intentional shared-user setups: sandbox all sessions, keep filesystem access workspace-scoped, and keep personal/private identities or credentials off that runtime.
• Emits security.trust_model.cross_agent_session_access_default for cross-agent session reach that no config narrows.
  • Condition: two or more agents have tools.sessions.visibility resolving to all and agent-to-agent access enabled with an omitted or empty tools.agentToAgent.allow list, provided at least one agent retains a session tool in an unclamped context (unsandboxed sessions or agents.defaults.sandbox.sessionToolsVisibility: "all"). No finding is emitted if every agent is clamped or has no session tools.
  • Severity: info for plain multi-agent setups, escalating to warn when an agent is sandboxed, has agent-level tool restrictions, or shared-user ingress signals suggest different trust levels.
  • Fix: the detail lists each agent's reach and allowed session tools. Narrow session visibility or agent-to-agent access for persona separation.
• Warns when small models (<=300B parameters) are used without sandboxing and with web/browser tools enabled.

Webhook/hooks

Startup logs a non-fatal security warning, and audit flags hooks.token reuse of active Gateway shared-secret auth values (gateway.auth.token / OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN, gateway.auth.password / OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD). Also warns when:

• hooks.token is short
• hooks.path="/"
• hooks.defaultSessionKey is unset
• hooks.allowedAgentIds is unrestricted
• request sessionKey overrides are enabled
• overrides are enabled without hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes

Run openclaw doctor --fix to rotate a persisted reused hooks.token, then update external hook senders to use the new token.

Sandbox/tools

• Warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off.
• Warns when gateway.nodes.commands.deny uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries (matching is exact node command-name only, not shell-text filtering).
• Warns when gateway.nodes.commands.allow explicitly enables dangerous node commands.
• Warns when global tools.profile="minimal" is overridden by agent tool profiles.
• Warns when write/edit tools are disabled but exec is still available without a constraining sandbox filesystem boundary.
• Warns when open DMs or groups expose runtime/filesystem tools without sandbox/workspace guards.
• Warns when installed plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy.

Sandbox browser

• Warns when sandbox browser uses Docker bridge network without sandbox.browser.cdpSourceRange.
• Flags dangerous sandbox Docker network modes, including host and container:* namespace joins.
• Warns when existing sandbox browser Docker containers have missing/stale hash labels (for example pre-migration containers missing openclaw.browserConfigEpoch) and recommends openclaw sandbox recreate --browser --all.

Network/discovery

• Flags gateway.allowRealIpFallback=true (header-spoofing risk if proxies are misconfigured).
• Flags discovery.mdns.mode="full" (metadata leakage via mDNS TXT records).
• Warns when gateway.auth.mode="none" leaves Gateway HTTP APIs reachable without a shared secret (/tools/invoke plus any enabled /v1/* endpoint).

Plugins/channels

• Warns when npm-based plugin/hook install records are unpinned, missing integrity metadata, or drift from currently installed package versions.
• Warns when channel allowlists rely on mutable names/emails/tags instead of stable IDs (Discord, Slack, Google Chat, Microsoft Teams, Mattermost, IRC scopes where applicable).

Source scans skip files above their per-file byte limit, including files that grow while being read. If a file changes during a read, the audit reports a scan failure; rerun after edits finish.

Dangerous flags

Settings prefixed with dangerous/dangerously are explicit break-glass operator overrides. Enabling one is not, by itself, a security vulnerability report. Audit reports them under the config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags checkId. For the complete dangerous-parameter inventory, see "Insecure or dangerous flags summary" in Security.

SecretRef behavior

security audit resolves supported SecretRefs in read-only mode for its targeted paths. If a SecretRef is unavailable in the current command path, audit continues and reports secretDiagnostics instead of crashing. --token and --password only override deep-probe auth for that command invocation; they do not rewrite config or SecretRef mappings.

Suppressions

Accept intentional standing findings with security.audit.suppressions. Each suppression matches an exact checkId and can be narrowed with case-insensitive titleIncludes and/or detailIncludes substrings:

{
  "security": {
    "audit": {
      "suppressions": [
        {
          "checkId": "plugins.tools_reachable_permissive_policy",
          "detailIncludes": "Enabled extension plugins: gbrain",
          "reason": "trusted local operator plugin"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}

Suppressed findings are removed from the active summary and findings list. JSON output keeps them under suppressedFindings for auditability. When suppressions are configured, active output also keeps an unsuppressible security.audit.suppressions.active info finding so readers can tell the audit was filtered. Dangerous config flags are emitted one flag per finding, so accepting one dangerous flag does not hide other enabled flags that share the same config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags checkId.

Because suppressions can hide standing risk, adding or removing them through agent-run shell commands requires exec approval unless exec is already running with security="full" and ask="off" for trusted local automation.

JSON output

openclaw security audit --json | jq '.summary'
openclaw security audit --deep --json | jq '.findings[] | select(.severity=="critical") | .checkId'

With --fix --json, output includes both fix actions and the final report:

openclaw security audit --fix --json | jq '{fix: .fix.ok, summary: .report.summary}'

What --fix changes

Applies safe, deterministic remediations:

• flips common groupPolicy="open" to groupPolicy="allowlist" (including account variants in supported channels)
• when WhatsApp group policy flips to allowlist, seeds groupAllowFrom from the stored allowFrom file when that list exists and config does not already define allowFrom
• tightens permissions for state/config and common sensitive files (credentials/*.json, legacy auth-profiles.json, openclaw-agent.sqlite, and legacy session artifacts)
• also tightens config include files referenced from openclaw.json
• uses chmod on POSIX hosts and icacls resets on Windows

--fix does not:

• rotate tokens/passwords/API keys
• disable tools (gateway, cron, exec, etc.)
• change gateway bind/auth/network exposure choices
• remove or rewrite plugins/skills

Related

• CLI reference
• Security audit