react-native/.github/workflows/expo-code-review-command.yml

# @ref LLP 0009#workflow-security-posture — issue_comment is not fork-restricted; runs with full secrets regardless of PR origin
name: AI code review (command)

# On-demand, ONE-SHOT reviewer triggered by a PR comment (maintainers only):
#   /review                        run once now; the router picks the agents
#   /review all                    run once with every agent
#   /review correctness security   run once with just those agents
# This never changes configuration. CONTINUOUS review is configured in
# expo-code-review.yml (the `pull_request` workflow) via the `review.trigger`
# policy in .expo-code-review/config.jsonc and the `ai-review:skip` label.

on:
  issue_comment:
    types: [created]

# Comment-only: read the repo, write PR comments (issue comments API).
permissions:
  contents: read
  pull-requests: write
  issues: write

env:
  # Published reviewer run via npx (override with repo variable ECR_VERSION; pin to
  # a specific version to freeze it). Used for the guard AND the review so the engine
  # that clears a config is the same engine that then reads it.
  ECR_VERSION: ${{ vars.ECR_VERSION || '0.14.0' }}

concurrency:
  group: ai-code-review-cmd-${{ github.event.issue.number }}
  cancel-in-progress: true

jobs:
  command:
    # Only PR comments starting with /review, from a maintainer.
    # @ref LLP 0009#workflow-security-posture [implements] — gate controls who triggers, not what code runs
    if: >-
      github.event.issue.pull_request != null &&
      startsWith(github.event.comment.body, '/review') &&
      contains(fromJson('["OWNER","MEMBER","COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.comment.author_association)
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    # Bound the run so a slow/stalled review fails fast rather than hanging. Keep it
    # above the passes budget (budget.totalPassesMinutes, 55m) + coordinator (10m) +
    # verification + setup, like the auto-review workflow's cap.
    timeout-minutes: 90
    # A reviewer failure must never fail the PR's checks.
    continue-on-error: true
    steps:
      # @ref LLP 0009#workflow-security-posture [implements] — comment body only via env:; agent ids sanitized before reaching argv
      - name: Parse command
        id: cmd
        env:
          # Via env (never inline ${{ }}) so an untrusted comment can't inject shell.
          COMMENT: ${{ github.event.comment.body }}
        run: |
          line=$(printf '%s' "$COMMENT" | head -n1 | tr -d '\r')
          verb=$(printf '%s' "$line" | awk '{print $1}')
          rest=$(printf '%s' "$line" | cut -s -d' ' -f2-)
          # Only /review (one-shot). Continuous review is policy/label-driven, not a
          # comment; /review no longer changes any configuration.
          if [ "$verb" != "/review" ]; then
            echo "run=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"; exit 0
          fi
          # Bare "/review" -> router picks; "all" -> every agent; names -> subset.
          # Sanitize agent ids to [a-zA-Z0-9,_-] to keep the value shell-safe.
          agents=""
          route=false
          if [ -z "$rest" ]; then
            route=true
          elif [ "$rest" != "all" ]; then
            agents=$(printf '%s' "$rest" | tr ' ' ',' | tr -cd 'a-zA-Z0-9,_-')
          fi
          {
            echo "run=true"
            echo "agents=$agents"
            echo "route=$route"
          } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

      - name: Acknowledge
        if: steps.cmd.outputs.run == 'true'
        env:
          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
        run: gh api -X POST "repos/${{ github.repository }}/issues/comments/${{ github.event.comment.id }}/reactions" -f content=eyes

      # SECURITY: `issue_comment` is NOT fork-restricted by GitHub — it always
      # runs in the base-repo context with full secrets and a write-scoped token,
      # regardless of whether the commented-on PR is from a fork. We check out ONLY
      # the trusted base ref (the default branch) for the `.expo-code-review/`
      # config, and never `gh pr checkout` the PR head. The reviewer engine itself
      # is the PUBLISHED @expo/code-review-cli (fetched by npx), not built from any
      # checkout, so attacker-controlled PR code never runs here. The diff + PR
      # metadata come from the API (`gh pr diff`/`gh pr view`); `ecr ci` loads
      # configuration from the PR's immutable base commit and reads source from a
      # head worktree scrubbed of ambient runtime config (opencode.json, plugins,
      # AGENTS.md, .env, …) — the same trust model as the pull_request workflow.
      - name: Checkout (base ref only — never the PR head)
        if: steps.cmd.outputs.run == 'true'
        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          fetch-depth: 1
          # The CLI's own git fetches authenticate through `gh` from GH_TOKEN, so
          # the token never lands in .git/config.
          persist-credentials: false

      - name: Set up Node
        if: steps.cmd.outputs.run == 'true'
        uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7.0.0
        with:
          node-version: 24
          # The reviewer runs via npx and never installs with a package manager, so
          # disable setup-node's auto package-manager cache (its post step would try
          # to save an empty cache and error).
          package-manager-cache: false

      # SECURITY: the base-ref checkout above includes every .expo-code-review/
      # config.jsonc + routing.jsonc, whose auth.tokenEnv names the env var the CLI
      # forwards as the model credential. The canonical guard ships with the CLI:
      # `ecr verify-config` sweeps every config (root + routing + all scopes, referenced
      # or not) with the engine's real JSONC parser and refuses unless tokenEnv appears
      # exactly once, in a ROOT-owned file, equal to ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV — so a
      # base-ref config change can't repoint it at another runner secret, sneak in a
      # JSON-escaped key, or stage an unreferenced scope config with its own auth.
      # This is layer 2; layer 1 is the runtime ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV lock in `ecr ci`.
      # Runs after Set up Node so the guard runs the SAME $ECR_VERSION `ecr ci` will.
      # @ref LLP 0009#guard-step-ordering-and-job-budgets [implements] — same $ECR_VERSION feeds guard and review
      - name: Guard config tokenEnv (root + routing + all scopes)
        if: steps.cmd.outputs.run == 'true'
        env:
          # (Comma-separated set for a multi-credential auth.providers config.)
          ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV: ${{ vars.ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV || 'META_API_KEY' }}
        run: npx --yes -p "@expo/code-review-cli@$ECR_VERSION" ecr verify-config

      - name: Run AI review
        if: steps.cmd.outputs.run == 'true'
        continue-on-error: true
        env:
          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
          # Layer-1 auth lock: the CLI refuses to run when the tokenEnv it would honor
          # differs from this. Keep it in sync with the guard's EXPECTED.
          ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV: ${{ vars.ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV || 'META_API_KEY' }}
          # Model credential — the env var named by auth.tokenEnv in config.jsonc.
          # Store each as a repo secret under the same name.
          # Updated per your setting: secret is EXPO_CODE_REVIEW_API_KEY, forwarded as META_API_KEY
          META_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.EXPO_CODE_REVIEW_API_KEY }}
          # Optional search-only credential for trusted platform documentation research.
          BRAVE_SEARCH_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.EXPO_BRAVE_SEARCH_API_KEY }}
          # Optional: override the model for every agent.
          REVIEWER_MODEL: ${{ vars.REVIEWER_MODEL }}
          AGENTS: ${{ steps.cmd.outputs.agents }}
          ROUTE: ${{ steps.cmd.outputs.route }}
        # NOTE: running via `issue_comment` makes this a manual /review, which the CLI
        # detects (GITHUB_EVENT_NAME=issue_comment) and treats as a trigger-gate bypass
        # — it reviews even when the config trigger policy or an `ai-review:skip` label
        # would skip the auto workflow. The bypass affects ONLY the trigger gate; the
        # config guard above, break-glass, and the auth lock still apply.
        run: |
          # Array (not a string) so the flags expand as separate argv entries
          # without unquoted word-splitting. AGENTS is a single sanitized,
          # space-free comma list, so it stays one element.
          ARGS=()
          if [ -n "$AGENTS" ]; then
            ARGS=(--agents "$AGENTS")
          elif [ "$ROUTE" = "true" ]; then
            ARGS=(--route)
          fi
          npx --yes -p "@expo/code-review-cli@$ECR_VERSION" ecr ci "${ARGS[@]}"

      # Same ephemeral per-run log as the pull_request workflow — a /review command
      # runs the full `ecr ci`, whose .expo-code-review/.runs/ log is gone when the
      # runner tears down. always() captures it even on error, gated on run=='true'
      # (a non-/review comment writes no log); issue.number IS the PR number here
      # (issue_comment context has no pull_request.number).
      - name: Upload review run log
        if: always() && steps.cmd.outputs.run == 'true'
        uses: ./.github/actions/upload-artifact
        with:
          name: review-run-log-pr${{ github.event.issue.number }}
          path: .expo-code-review/.runs/reviews.jsonl
          if-no-files-found: ignore
          retention-days: 14